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CHAPTER I
---

INTRODUCTION

Review of Literature
Since Janis and Field identified the general factor of susceptibility to persuasion, or persuasibility, in 1956, 1 it has been of
11

11

particular interest to those concerned with attitude change and group
dynamics. 2 Many studies have been conducted to analyze the personality
correlates of persuasibility.

Several investigators have found that

those who are 11 persuasible are also •dogmatic• or •closed-minded•,
which seems almost a contradiction of terms if the concept •closedminded• is taken at fact value. 113 This study was designed to investigate the possibility that the relationship might be explained by the
existence of response bias in the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale.

For example,

do persuasible people have a high intolerance of ambiguity? Do persua1 Irving L. Janis and Peter B. Field, 11 A Behavioral Assessment of
Persuasi bi 1i ty: Consistency of Indivi dua 1 Differences, Sociometry,
XIX (1956), 241-59.
2carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, Personality and Persuasibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1.
3Gary Cronkhite, Persuasion: Speech and Behavioral Change
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1969), p. 131.
11

1

2

sible people appear dogmatic because of the ambiguous nature of the
stimulus? Does the subject•s uncertainty tend to cause high scores on
the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale?
In his theoretical formulation of open and closed mindedness,
Milton Rokeach contended that individuals differ in their ability to
receive, evaluate, and act on information relevant to a particular belief system.

This individual difference is often referred to as open-

(or closed)mindedness, that is, the degree to which an individual is
receptive to new ideas and to arguments.4 A major factor determining
the degree of open-mindedness, according to Rokeach, is the capacity to
distinguish information about a given topic from information about the
source of that topic.

He suggested, then, that the person with an open

belief system is more likely to resist pressures from external sources.5
Thus, it is the closed-minded, or dogmatic, person, according to
Rokeach, who should be the most persuasible.
Using the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E, to identify persons
who have closed systems of thinking, several investigators conducted
studies that confirm such a relationship.

Norris reported data that

gives some support to the hypothesis of greater attitude change for the
closed-minded subjects.6 After administering the Dogmatism Scale to 101
students, the experimenter presented them with four messages attacking
4webster•s Seventh New Colle iate Dictionar , (Springfield, Mass.:
G. and C. Merriam Company, 1971 , p. 591.
5Milton Rokeach, The ·ooen ·and 'Closed 'Mind (New York:
1968), p. 58~

Basic Books,

6Eleanor L. Norris, ••Attitude Change as a Function of Open or
Closed Mindedness, .. ·Journalism ·Quartetly, XLII (Autumn, 1965), 571-75.

3

positively-evaluated concepts.

The topics attacked were annual chest

x-rays for the detection of tuberculosis, the routine use of penicillin,
tooth-brushing, and annual medical check-ups.

The messages, written in

news story form, were all presented as coming from the U.S. Public
Health Service, a highly authoritative source. A two way analysis of
variance showed that closed-minded subjects (those scoring above the
mean of 129 on the Dogmatism Scale) did exhibit significantly greater
attitude change than did open-minded subjects. 7
Cronkhite states that the relationship between dogmatism and
persuasibility has also been confirmed in studies by Hunt and Miller,
and others by Cronkhite and Goetz. The results of these studies were
reported in papers presented at the Speech Association of America in
New York City in December of 1965. 8
A number of experimenters have reported that subjects who score
high on Adorno•s F-Scale (a measure of authoritarianism quite similar to
the Dogmatism Scale) 9 are more likely to conform. One criticism of the
F-Scale is that some ideological groups emerge as nonauthoritarianism
when measured by the F-Scale. 1 Further research, however, shows that

°

most of these groups share some of the rigidities of authoritarianism.

11

Wells, Weinert, and Rubel, for example, presented subjects with pictures
7Ibid., 573.
8cronkhite, Persuasion, p. 131.
9F. Lerlinger and Milton Rokeach, 11 The Factorial Nature of the F
and D Scales, .. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (October, 1966), 397.
10Daryl J. Bern, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs (Belmont:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1970), p. 23.
11 Ibid.
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of a traffic accident and asked them to say which driver was at fault. 12
The pictures were drawn so that the verdict was obvious. Under conditions designed to produce conformity pressure, however, subjects who
-

yielded to these pressures had significantly higher authoritarianism
scores than those who resisted the pressure. 13 Additional support of
the contention that authoritarians tend toward conformity has been presented by Jahoda and Cook, 14 Block and Block, 15 Crutchfield, 16 and Harvey and Beverly. 17
Review of the literature shows a lack of attempts to explain why
there is a relationship between closed-mindedness and persuasibility,
with the possible exception of a study by Powell. 18 Though Powell's
study was not concerned with persuasibility, he did find support for
Rokeach•s theory that open and closed-minded subjects differ in their
12w. D. Wells, Guy Weinert, and Marilyn Rubel, "Conformity Pressure and Authoritarian Personality," ·The Journal of ·social ·psychology,
IV (October, 1966), 397.
13I bi d. ' 134.
1

~. Jahoda and S. W. Cook, 11 Ideological Compliance as a Social
Psychological Process," Totalitarianism, ed. C. J. Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 203-22.
15J. Block and J. Block, "An Interpersonal Experiment on Reactions
to Authority, .. Human Relations, V (February, 1952), 91-98.
16R. S. Crutchfield, 11 Confonnity and Character, .. American Psycholog i s t , X (May , 19 55) , 191-9 8.

l7o. J. Harvey and George D. Beverly, 11 Some Personality Correl~tes
of Concept Change Through Role Playing, 11 Journal of Abnonnal and Soc1al
Psychology, LXV (1962), 61-64.
0pen and Closed Mindedness and The Ab~lity
to Differentiate Source and Message, .. ·Journal ·of Abnormal and Soc1al
Psychology, LXV (1962), 61-64.
1

~redric A. Powell,

11
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ability to differentiate between sources and messages.l9
Cronkhite, however, believes that the relationship between dogmatism and persuasibility may depend on the other unidentified factors.20
He reports that, acEordi_ng to the Cronkhite and Goetz study, dogmatism
and persuasibility are related to what experimenters tenned "attitude
instability, 11 the tendency of a subject•s attitude to fluctuate even in
the absence of systematic attempts to persuade.21
Stewart suggested a possible integration between studies of tolerance for ambiguity, dogmatism, and persuasibility.22 Stewart•s study
represents an effort to integrate material in order to explain the relationship between persuasibility and dogmatism.
It seems likely that a subject•s uncertainty may be an important
factor in this relationship.

Specifically, high scores on the Rokeach

Dogmatism Scale may actually reflect the subject•s uncertainty about
items on the scale due to the ambiguous nature of the items.

If the

individual has no definite attitudes of either kind, according to Cronbach, then his response must be based on response set, and any inference
to attitude content is invalid.

Cronbach demonstrated that most students tend to respond "agree" rather than "disagree" when uncertain. 23
Berg and Rapaport presented evidence that the confounding of con19 Ibid., 64.
20 cronkhite, Persuasion, p. 132.
21 Ibid.
22 Robert A. Stewart, Integration of Tolerance for Ambiguity and
Persuasibility Studies of Self Esteem," ·psychological Reports, XXIII
(December, 1968), 1104.
23L. J. Cronbach, 11 Response Sets and Test Validity, .. Educational
and Psychological Measurement, VI (1946), 479-82.
11

6

tent response by response-set tendencies is particularly likely when
all items are keyed positively.24 They gave subjects a questionnaire
form which had no actual questions but which required the subjects to
.. imagine the Correct -answer 11 •
options such as

11

The answers pres en ted them were various

true, 11 11 false, .. 11 YeS, 11

11

Uncertain, 11 and 11 no 11 •

Response

bias appeared at a high level of statistical significance, reaching chi
square values above 80 in some cases.

The major factor in the observed

biases was the preference for 11 agree, 11 11 yes, 11 and 11 true 11 type answers.25
Since the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale consists exclusively of items keyed in
a single direction, Peabody hypothesized that agreement response sets
affect high scores on the Dogmatism Scale because agreement is always
scored positively.26 Two weeks after administering the Dogmatism Scale,
he gave the same subjects reversals of the original items.

He reasoned

that true authoritarianism would be reflected by items whose original
form was endorsed and reversed form rejected.
meeting the criterion was .15.

The proportion of items

The nonauthoritarianism criterion, _that

is, disagreement with original and endorsement of reversed items, however, was met by 45%of the responses.27

In addition, 32% of the res-

ponses were on the Double-agreement type, that is agreement to both
original and reversed items.28 Double agreement, then, is about twice
24I. A. Berg and G. M. Rapaport, 11 Response Bias in an Unstructured Questionnaire, .. Journal of Psychology, XXXVIII (1954), 475-81.
25 Ibid., 481.
26oean Peabody, 11 Attitude Content and Agreement Set.in Scales of
Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism .and Econom1c Conservatism ' 11 ·Journa 1 of Abnormal and So·c ial .Psychology,
LXI I I (1961), 10.
.
27Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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as frequent as true authoritarianism responses.

Peabody also reported

that of all the Dogmatism Scale items agreed to in the original, 67%
29
were also agreed to in their reversed forms.
His results indicated
that agreement with the originals could usually be attributed to agreement response set rather than attitudes favorable to dogmatism.

Licht-

enstein, Quinn, and Hover, using two different measures of agreement
response set, also found data to indicate that the Dogmatism Scale is
vulnerable to acquiescence response set. 30
Peabody believes that acquiescence response tendencies operate
when an item is ambiguously worded.

Most authoritarianism items, he

contends, are ambiguous; thus, the high incidence of double agreement
31
in the data.
Rokeach has suggested that double-agreement can be explained by
the fact that the subject tells the truth in one case because he sees no
reason why he should not but deliberately 1i es in the second case because
he sees the lie as being a more socially desirable answer. 32 The assumption, however, that dogmatism scale reversals are viewed as socially
more desirable than original items, according to McBride and Moran, appears untenable and unsupported. 33
29 Ibid.
30 E. Lichtenstein, R. P. Quinn, and G. L. Hover, Dogmatism and
Acquiescent Response Set, .. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
LXIII (1961), 636-38.
31 Peabody, Attitude Content," 10.
32
Milton Rokeach, The Double Agreement Phenomenon: Three Hypotheses, .. Psychological Review, LXX (July, 1963), 305.
33 Loren McBride and Gary Moran Double Agreement as a Function
of Item Ambiguity and Susceptibility to Demand Implications of the Psychological Situation, .. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, VI
(May, 1967), 116.
11

11

11

11

8

Rokeach has objected to Peabody's claim that items in the Dogmatism Scale are ambiguous. He noted that Peabody's statement was made,
Without providing the slightest independent empirical support, that
response set is a -fllflction of ambiguity of items ... 34
11

McBride and Moran, however, have demonstrated that double agreement on the Dogmatism Scale is, indeed, highly dependent upon the relative ambiguity of the items involved. 35 Three experimenters had 166
psychology students rate the ambiguity of each item on the Dogmatism
Scale using an eight-point rating scale. In this manner, mean ambiguity
scale values were obtained for each item.

Both original and reversed

forms of the Dogmatism Scale were administered to subjects.

Data indi-

cate that double agreement on the Dogmatism Scale correlated .83 with
the rated ambiguity of items, a highly significant correlation. 36 They
also presented strong evidence to indicate that approval-dependent individuals shows more double-agreement and point out that in other situations double-agreers would have been classified erroneously as authoritarians.37 A study conducted by Miklich also yielded data indicating
that the ambiguous items on the Dogmatism Scale did elicit more agree38
ment response set.
Peabody contends that the existence of ambiguity on items of the
Dogmatism Scale is generally recognized by those who have examined them
34Rokeach, 11 Double Agreement, .. 307.
35
~1cBride and Moran, Double Agreement, .. 117.
36 Ibid.
11

37 Ibid., 118.
38o. R. Miklich, "Item Characteristics and Agreement-Disagreement
Response Set," Dissertation Abstracts, XXVI (1965), p. 6210.

9

closely, with the possible exception of Rokeach. 39 In the construction
of the dogmatism scales, according to Peabody, the intention to have
both rational and irrational aspects in each item produced amb.iguity.

--

In addition, Miklich reported that his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
(1965) contains evidence to show that the content of the D_ogmati sm
Scale is ambiguous.40
Accumulated data, then, do seem to indicate that items on the
Dogmatism Scale are

am~iguous

and that agreement response sets operate

as a joint function with definite attitudes.
Thus, high scores on the Dogmatism Scale might well be re-interpreted as actually reflecting uncertainty.

The relationship of this

uncertainty to persuasibility fits well within the consistency theories
of attitude change.

Osgood and Tannenbaum, proponents of this theory of

attitude change, contend that changes in evaluation are always in the
direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference. 41
For example, if a person or other some source of information which a
subject regards positively (or negatively) supports an opinion which the
subject regards negatively (or positively), "there is a marked tendency
to change either the evaluation of the opinion or the evaluation of the
source in a direction which would reduce incongruity.42 Festinger, in
39Dean Peabody, 11 Authoritarianism Scales and Response Bias, 11 Psychological Bulletin, LXV (January, 1966), 13.
40D. R. Miklich, 11 Peabody•s Agreement Response Set Measure: A
Reply to Samelson," PSYtholoQical ·Reports, XVIII (January-June, 1966),
200.
4lc. E. Osgood and P. Tannenbaum, 11 The Principles -of Co.ngruity and
the Predictirin of Attitude Change,•• · p~ychologic~l Re~iew, LXIII (January, 1955), 43.
42 Ibid.

10

his congruity dissonance theory, also maintains · that there is pressure
toward consonant relations among c_o gniti ons and to avoid and reduce dissonance.43 Therefore, as a subject tends to be certain about items he
--

sees as ambiguous, dissonance may have arisen.

If that subject had low

tolerance for amb_iguity, pressure to restore consonance or balance
should be great.

The combination of uncertainty, dissonance arousal,

and low tolerance for amb.iguity could lead to attitude change. Such a
prediction fits Crutchfield•s finding that subjects who have a high
conformity score tend to agree with tests that represent an intolerance
for ambiguity. 44
A high persuasibility score, then, may reflect uncertainty and
intolerance of ambiguity on the part of the subject.

Thus, the rela-

tionship between a high dogmatism score and a high persuasibility
score may be explained in part by the fact that the subject has a high
intolerance for ambiguity and is actually uncertain about items on the
Dogmatism Scale due to their ambiguous nature.

The purpose of this

study is to examine this explanation.
Operational Definitions
1. High dogmatism: The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, FormE, was administered to all subjects.

Since upper and lower groups consisting of

25% from the extremes of the criterion score distribution are optimal
.for the . s~u9~ . ~~ - ~est items,45 the upper 25% of the dogmatism scores
43Leon Festinger~ .A.Theory ·of ·cognitive ·Dissonance (Evanston: Row
Peterson , 1957 },' p• 9•
44crutchfield, Conformity and Character, .. 195.
45Truman L. Ke 11 ey ~ 11 The Se 1ect i.on ..of .upper .and Lower .Groups for
the Validation of Test Items, .. ·Jaurnal ·of .Educational ·psychology, XXX
(January, 1939}, 24.
11

11
were considered h.igh.

Those scores of 169 and above were in the upper

quartile.
2.

Low D.ogmatism:

The lower 25% of the dogmatism scores were

considered low. ·scores of 134 and below were in the lower quartile.
3.

High Persuasibility: A persuasibility score was obtained for

each subject by use of the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test. The upper
25% of the scores, scores of 14 and above were considered high.
4.

Low Persuasibility:

The lower 25% of the scores, scores of 8

and below, were considered low.
5.

High intolerance of ambiguity: An intolerance of ambiguity

score was obtained for each subject by use of the Budner Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale.

The upper 25% of the scores were considered high.

Scores of 56 and above were in the upper quartile •
.6. Low intolerance of ambiguity: The lower 25% of the scores,
scores of 42 and below, were considered low.
7.

Uncertainty Score:

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, reconstruct-

ed by the author, to provide an uncertainty category (Form P), was administered to each subject.

The total number of times a subject answer-

ed Uncertain due to ambiguous nature of the statement, .. on Form P was
11

that subject•s uncertainty score.
Research Hypotheses
1. Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have
significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who score low on the
persuasibility test.
2.

Subjects who score high on the intolerance of ambiguity scale

will have significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who score low

12

on the intolerance of ambiguity scale.
3.

Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have

significantly higher intolerance of ambiguity scores than those who
score low on the ·persuasibility test.
~~ 4.

There will be a significant positive correlation between

dogmatism scores and uncertainty scores.
5.

Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have

significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score low on the
persuasibility test.
6.

Subjects who score high on the dogmatism scale will have

significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score low on the
dogmatism scale.
7.

Subjects who score high on the intolerance of ambiguity scale

will have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score
low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale.
The first two hypotheses were designed to determine the relationship between persuasibility and dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity
and dogmatism.

Dogmatism scores provided the dependent variable, and

persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity, the independent variables.
The third hypothesis was designed to determine the relationship
between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity.

The dependent var-

iable is intolerance of ambiguity, and persuasibility is the independent
variable.
Hypothesis four was designed to determine whether or not a significant correlation exists between
scores.

~ogmatism

scores and uncertainty

13

The fifth, sixth, and seventh hypotheses were designed to determine the relationship between persuasibility, dogmatism, intolerance of
ambiguity, and uncertainty scores.

The independent variables are the

persuasibility, dogmatism, and intolerance of ambiguity scores.
dependent variable is the uncertainty score.

The

CHAPTER II

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Subjects
Subjects were 121 students enrolled in seven undergraduate
speech classes at Auburn University.

They were assigned to the classes

by the Registrar on the bas 'is of class requests in the order received
and on the basis of class size.
Measurement
Janis-Field Persuasibility Test
This test consists of three components:

(1) the Initial

Questionnaire, followed by (2) Booklet I, containing five persuasive
communications on five topics, each of which is followed by the three
pertinent questions from the Initial Questionnaire, followed by (3)
Booklet II, a second series of five persuasive communications on
exactly the same topics as the first series, but taking diametrically
opposite positions to those taken in the first series.

After each com-

munication in Booklet II the subjects are given the same opinion questions they had answered earlier in the Initial Questionnaire and in Booklet I.

At three different times the subjects are asked to express their

opinions:

first, before any communication is presented; a second time,

after reading the initial set of communications (Booklet I); and again

15

after reading an opposing set of communications (Booklet II).

The

tests are scored accordi_ng to the number .of opinion cha_nges produced.
The

r~nge

of possible scores is 0 to 30, with higher scores representing

more persuasible subjects.
The reliability of the persuasibility test was investigated by
the author in a subsample of approximately 100 cases. The subsample
was a stratified random sample of approximately equal numbers of male
and female subjects.

The split-half reliability was determined by

giving each subject one persuasibility score on the 15 odd items and
another score on the 15 even items.

Just as with the total scores

based on all 30 items, the subtest scores represent the number of items
on which an individual showed an opinion change in the direction advocated by one or another of the communications.

The raw reliability co-

efficient was found to be .69; the estimated value or the reliability
coefficient was .81 when corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula. 46
The internal consistency of the persuasibility test was studied
in the same subsample.

Data showed a positive relationship among chang-

es on the various topics comprising the persuasibility. Janis and Field
repprt that the findings support the general hypothesis that there are
consistent individual differences in the opinion changes elicited by a
series of diverse communications. 47
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E
This scale is the most refined draft of a series of five ed.. it1on~ . th~t . h~q . Qeen subjected to item analysis and reliability stud46carl Hovland and 1. .L. Janis~ · Persona 1itY ·and ·Persuasibil ity
{New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959)., ·p • .41.
47 Ibid., p. 43.
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ies to isolate the most consistent and discriminating items. Form E is
composed of 40 items, each attempting to measure a specific characteristic of the theory of open and closed belief-disbelief systems described by Rokeach.48The scale is presented as a personal opinion questionnaire containing the forty items to which the subject must respond in terms of
the degree to which he agrees or disagrees with that statement. The
response is made according to a six point scale ranging from I agree
11

very much 11 to 11 I disagree very much 11 •

The subject must indicate his

opinion by responding with a plus or a minus 1, 2, or 3 depending on
the extent to which he agrees or disagrees with the statement. All the
statements are keyed in a single direction; that is, a positive answer
always indicates closed-mindedness, while a negative answer al\'Jays indicates open-mindedness.

The more positive the response, then the more

it contributes to the score of dogmatism, or more simply, closed-mindedness.
Rokeach reports reliability ranging from .68 to .93 with a median
r of approximately .78.49 All but two of these reliability coefficients
were calculated by the split-half method and corrected by the SpearmanBrown formula for increasing test length.

Test-retest reliability

coefficients yielded .84 with one month intervals and .71 with a five to
six month interval.
The Dogmatism Scale has construct validity in that its construction was based.....
directly
on the very qualities Rokeach used to describe
.

.. ... . .. . .

'

48Rokeach~ ·The ·open ·and · c16ied · Mi~d, p. 73.
49 Ibid., p. 90.
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dogmatism.

Although high scores, as pointed out in the revietJ of liter-

ature, might reflect a tendency to agree when uncertain, the scale does
discriminate between individuals that actually do operate in a different
manner on certain tasks.

It separates individuals by the extent of

their dogmatism with the dogmatism of others, based on the same standards.
Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale
The scale is made up of 16 statements with each statement designed to tap at least one of the four postulated indicators of perceived
threat and to refer to at least one of the three types of ambiguous
situations defined.

The perceived threat component is inserted to ex-

tract a reaction from the subjects.

These 16 statements were selected

after subjecting the initial group of 33 items to item analysis and
reliability studies.
different groups.

The scale was administered to 813 subjects in 16

Reliabilities were computed by means of Cronbach's

alpha formula, with the mean of the scale in these samples being approximately .49.50 Though the magnitude of these reliability coefficients compares unfavorably with those usually reported, Budner lists
three contributing factors:

use of the alpha rather than the split-

half coefficient which tends to overestimate the reliability figure; the
freedom of the ambiguity scale from acquiescence and social desirability estimates, and the complex multidimensional nature of the concept
itself since it is generally true that the more complex the construct
and . the
more complex
the measure, the lower will be the reliability
.... . ..
. .
50 stanley Budner, .11 lntolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Vari ab 1e, II · Journa 1 ·of · Persona 1; ty, XXX (March, 1962), 34.
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estimate. 51

In addition, a 15 member experimental group was given the

ambiguity scale twice, at intervals ranging from two weeks to two months, with a test-retest correlation of .85.
Validity was -established by several methods.

The scale shows

significant correlation (.05) with three other scales designed to measure intolerance of ambiguity.

Significant correlations were also ob-

tained with the scale and judgements of autobiographical material (.05)
and with the scale and peer ratings in terms of tolerance-intolerance
of ambiguity (.01).
This scale has an equal number of positively and negatively
keyed items.

Very low and insignificant correlations were obtained

between two measures of acquiescence and the Intolerance of Ambiguity
Scale. 52 Correlation between a measure of social desirability and the
ambiguity scale seems to be relatively free of both acquiescent and social desirability response tendencies.53
Procedure
The 121 subjects were in seven classes and each class was assigned a letter of identification:

Groups A, 8, C, D, E, F, and G. Tests

were administered as a part of two regularly scheduled class meetings.
In the first treatment, all groups completed the Initial Questionnaire.
Form E.

Groups A, C, E, and G completed the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale,

Groups 8, D, and F completed Form P of the Dogmatism Scale.

All groups completed Booklet I of the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test.
5lioid., 35.
52 Ibid., 33.
53ro;d.
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In the second treatment, (two weeks after the first treatment),
all groups completed the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Groups
A, C, E, and G completed Form P of the Dogmatism Scale. Groups B, D,
and F completed the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E.
All subjects responded to all materials.
Data Analysis
In analyzing the data, the mean scores of subjects were compared
for statistical significant differences by the use of the t test.

Ken-

dall's tau coefficient was used to determine the correlation between
dogmatism scores and uncertainty scores.
relation measure were used.

Three t tests and one cor-

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects who score high on the persuasibility test would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than
those who scored low on the persuasibility test. The hypothesis was
supported.

Results were significant at the .05 level. All tests were

one-tailed.

Results of hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOGMATISM

SCORES OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN PERSUASIBILITY AND
BETWEEN SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN INTOLERANCE OF Af\1BIGUITY
Variables

No.

Mean of Dog, Scores

Variance

df

t

Hi Persuasi.
Lo Persuasi.

34
35

167.088
135.971

741.232
1063.556

67

4.296*

Hi Intolerance 32
Lo Intolerance 31

163.031
138.613

750.353
1430.110

61

2.942*

*Significant at the .05 level.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects who scored high on the intolerance of ambiguity scale would have significantly higher dogmatism
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scores than those who scored low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale.
Results of the t test supported the hypothesis, showing significance at
the .05 level, as indicated in Table 1.
TABLE 2
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTOLERANCE
OF M·1BIGUITY SCORES OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN
PERSUASIBILITY
Variables

No.

Mean of Intol. Scores

Variance

df

t

Hi Persuas.
Lo Persuas.

34
35

49.647
49.200

81.750
108.812

67

0.190

Hypothesis 3 prediced that subjects who scored high on the persuasibility test would have significantly higher intolerance of ambiguity scores than those who scored low on the persuasibility test. As
indicated in Table 2, the analysis using the t test failed to support
the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant correlation between dogmatism scores and uncertainty scores.
was used to test the hypothesis.

Kendall's Rank-Order Correlation

Results showed the value of Kendall's

tau to be +.02, which represents practically no correlation at all.
The hypothesis was rejected since results were not significant at the
.05 level.

The data used in Table 2 is shown in Appendix B.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that subjects who had high persuasibility
scores would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those
who had low persuasibility scores.

The t tests failed to support the
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hypothesis, as indicated in Table 3.
TABLE 3
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY SCORES
OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN PERSUASIBILITY, BETWEEN SUBJECTS
HIGH AND LOW IN DOGMATISM, AND BETWEEN SUBJECTS HIGH AND
LOW IN INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY
Variables · · ·

No~

· · · ·Mean ·of ·unct ~ ·Scores · · ·varia nee · · · ·df · · · · · · ·t · · ·

34
35

1.853
4.171

4.553
43.793

67

1.947

Hi Dogmatism 31
Lo Dogmatism 32

2.258
3.125

5.598
39:. 145

61

0.723

32
31

2.656
2.806

9.459
39.295

61

0.121

Hi Persuas.
Lo Persuas.

Hi Intol.
Lo Intol.

There was no significant difference between the uncertainty scores of
the two groups at the .05 level, and results were in the direction opposite to that predicted.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that subjects who had high dogmatism
scores would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those
who had low dogmatism scores.
.

The t test was used to analyze results,

and the hypothesis was rejected.

There was no significant difference

between the uncertainty scores of the two groups. The results, however,
were in the direction opposite that predicted, as seen in Table 3.

CHAPTER IV
- ..

-

DISCUSSION
Conclusion
First Conclusion
A relationship exists between high scores on the Rokeach
Dogmatism Scale and high scores on the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test.
People who are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more persuasible than those who are not dogmatic.

This finding was expected and

agrees with results from earlier studies, (Supra, p. 2).
Second Conclusion
A relationship exists between high scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale and high scores on the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity
Scale.

People who are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more

intolerant of ambiguity than those who are not dogmatic.
Third Conclusion
People who are highly persuasible are not significantly more
tolerant of ambiguity than those who are not persuasible.

Contrary to

the prediction included in Chapter I based on Crutchfield•s results and
the balance theories of attitude change, there seems to be no significant
relationship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity.

Con-

sequently, intolerance of ambiguity apparently is not a factor in the
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relationship between dogmatism and persuasibility.
The contradiction with Crutchfield•s earlier findings might be
explained by considering possible differences between conformity, with
which his experiment -was concerned, and persuasi bil ity as measured by
the Janis-Field Test.

Further investigation would be required to con-

firm this explanation and to establish the definite lack of relationship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity.
Fourth Conclusion
Uncertainty due to the ambiguous items on the scale, as measured
by the reconstructed form of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, is not a factor in the relationship between dogmatism and persuasibility. There was
no significant correlation between dogmatism and uncertainty scores. No
relationship was demonstrated between high persuasibility, dogmatism, or
intolerance of ambiguity scores and high uncertainty scores.
Although there were no findings of statistical significance concerning the uncertainty score, the consistency of their direction raised
some interesting questions.

In every case in which the uncertainty

scores were compared with the other three variables there was a tendency
for the uncertainty score to be in the opposite direction from that predicted.

For example, subjects who had high dogmatism scores, instead of

having significantly higher uncertainty scores as predicted, had slightly
lower uncertainty scores than those who had low dogmatism scores. Table
3 shows that the same was true for both persuasibility and intolerance
of ambiguity.

These results suggest the following possible conclusions:
a.

Those subjects who tend to be uncertain
about items on the dogmatism scale because
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of the

am~iguous

nature of the items are

not erroneously classified dogmatic.

Ac-

quiescent response set based on the sub-

--

ject's uncertainty and ambiguity of the
stimulus, therefore, could not be cited as
a factor in the relationship.
b.

An alternative explanation is that the
reconstructed form of the dogmatism
scale failed to measure true uncertainty.
If the scale did not actually measure
uncertainty, it is still possible that at
least a portion of the theory underlying
this experiment is valid.

There are several reasons for believing the latter explanation
is true.

First, there was a tendency for the students to avoid select-

ing the uncertainty category.

From a possible score range of 0 to 40

the overall mean of the uncertainty scores was only 2.78.

In addition,

37 of the 121 subjects had a score of 0, indicating that they were not
certain about any of the forty statements.

When discussing the results

with the students later, however, many of them expressed contradictory
opinions.
11

Unclear,''

They complained that many of the statements on the scale were
11

Confusing, 11 and 11 could be taken to mean different things to

different people ... When asked why their uncertainty scores did not
reflect these findings, several explanations were:
11
I didn't know it would be
all right to
11
rna rk that answer often;
11
I don't like to keep answering as if I
don't have any opinions about things; ..
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11

Th~

1 didn•t notice that we had a chance to
be neutral--! was just used to the idea
of .agreei.ng or disagreeing. 11

most l.ogical explanation for the very low uncertainty scores seems

to be that the

col)~ge

students who served as subjects have been some-

what 11 Conditioned 11 to. give yes or no answers and to avoid a neutral or
uncertain position.
Additional evidence for the idea that the uncertainty category
failed to elicit response from those who were actually uncertain can
be found on the test papers in the form of erasures, changed answers,
marks beside the statements, question marks, and omitted answers.

For

example, it was not uncommon for a subject to place a question mark in
the margin beside an item, to circle a number, and later scratch
through that answer and select another number.

The ambivalence suggests

uncertainty on the part of the subject, but the uncertainty category
was avoided.
Based on the balance theories of attitude change, this study was
designed to supply an 11 escape 11 or 11 Way out 11 of the dissonance-producing
ambiguous situation for those who were intolerant of ambiguity.

It was

theorized that the person who had a high intolerance score and also a
high persuasibility score was prompted by response set tendencies to agree when uncertain and thus have a high dogmatism score.

It was fur-

ther predicted that he would state his uncertainty and neutrality when
allowed to do so, thus escaping the dissonance situation.
The subjects, however, apparently did not see this choice as an
escape.

Perhaps, if one has a h.igh intolerance of ambiguity, that is,

sees ambiguous situations as threatening, he will avoid admitting that
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he is

faci~g

an

am~iguous

situation.

Perhaps seeing a situation as

ambiguous and remaini.ng uncertain about it would increase, rather
than decrease, dissonance.
On the other h~nd, one who sees

am~iguous

situations as non-

threateni.ng (has an intolerance of amb.iguity score) will admit more
readily that he is faced with an ambiguous
situation, call it that '
.
and be content not to make a decision about it. Therefore, both the
predicted results of the study and the contradictory actual results
with regard to the uncertainty factor may still be consistent with
balance theories.
·· Recommendations
Once the factors that cause the relationship between dogmatism
and persuasibility are isolated, it might be possible to formulate
principles of persuasion to be employed by a persuader with a given
audience.

This study failed to provide an acceptable explanation for

this relationship.

Several suggestions for further research, however,

can be made.
1. More investigation is needed in order to confirm the lack
of relationship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity.
A study designed to investigate the relationship using measures of persuasibility and intolerance other than the ones used in this study
would be of value.

This information would increase accumulated know-

1edge concerni.ng the persona 1i ty corre l·ates of persuas ibi 1i ty.
2. It would be worthwhile to test the idea that response bias
causes high d.ogmati sm ·scores usi.ng other measures of uncertainty, such
as doub 1e .agreement, changed answers, et cetera. A1though Peabody demon-
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strated (Supra, p. 6) that double .agreement was about twice as frequent
as true authoritarianism responses, he did not show that double agreement was related to h.igh scores on the d_ogmatism seal e.

Such a study

m.ight produce valuable results for understandi.ng d.ogmatism scores.
3. Further testi~g is needed of Rokeach•s contention that dogmatic subjects are more persuasible because they cannot separate the
message from the source.

Tho.ugh Powell 1 s experiment · {Supra, p. 3) pro-

duced data supporting the idea that open-minded subjects can differentiate between source and message better than closed-minded subjects, similar findings, taking into consideration both persuasibility and dogmatism, would strengthen the conclusion.
4. Research should be conducted to determine the relationship
between dogmatism and persuasibility using a measure of persuasibility
that includes the alteration of more centralized beliefs.

The topics

on the Janis-Field Test are all aimed at altering what Rokeach calls
inconsequential or peripheral beliefs (Type E).53 Wright and Harvey
found that authoritarians tend to uprotect their attitudes toward a
limited number of central concepts at the expense of the larger number
of peripheral ones.u54 This finding suggests that dogmatic subjects
might actually be more persuasible only when their less important beliefs are under question.

This idea should be investigated experimen-

tally •
.f~rt~er . inves~igation will produce more ins~ght into the rela53 Ibi d.

54Mi 1ton Rokeach, ·Bel i.efs; ·Attitudes; ·and ·va 1ues (San Franci sea:
Jossey-Bass, · Inc., l968), . p. 1'1
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tionship between persuasibility and d.ogmatism and possibly solidify
concepts from which some

principl~s

of persuasion can be developed.

· ·surruna ry
Several

inves~igators

have found that those who are

ceptible to persuasion are significantly more
are less susceptible to persuasion.

~ogmatic

h~ghly

sus-

than those who

Altho.ugh Cronkhite, in his book,

Persuasion: · ·speech ·and ·sehavioral ·change, su_ggests that the relationship between these two variables seems surprising, few studies have
been done to determine why the relationship exists.
This study was designed to investigate the possibility that persuasible people, who are expected to have a high intolerance of ambiguity, might appear to be dogmatic because of a response bias previously
demonstrated in the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale.
Positive answers on the Rokeach Scale always signify dogmatism,
and studies have shown that people tend to give positive answers when
they are uncertain about ambiguous questions.

Thus, it was hypothe-

sized that a persuasible person who is highly intolerant of ambiguity
might have a high score on the Rokeach Scale because of the response
bias factor.
Subjects for the study were 121 undergraduate students at Auburn
University.

Tests were administered in order to obtain persuasibility,

dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and uncertainty scores for each
subject.
The statistical measures applied to the data were three t tests
and Kendall s Rank-Order Correlation.
1

Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects who scored high on the per-
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suasibility test would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than
those who scored low on the persuasibility test.

Hypothesis 2 predicted

that subjects who scored high on the intolerance of

am~iguity

scale

would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who scored
low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that

subjects who scored high on the persuasibility test would have significantly higher intolerance of ambiguity scores than those who had scored
low on the persuasibility test.

Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant

correlation between dogmatism and uncertainty scores.

Hypothesis 5 pre-

dicted that subjects who had high persuasibility scoY'es would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who had low persuasibility scores.

The sixth, and final hypothesis, predicted that subjects

who had high dogmatism scores would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who had low dogmatism scores.
There were four principle conclusions drawn from the study.

Peo-

ple W1o are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more persuasible
than those who are not dogmatic.

People who are highly persuasible are

not significantly more toler~nt of ambiguity than those who are not
persuasible.

Thirdly, people who are highly dogmatic appear to be sig-

nificantly more intolerant of ambiguity than those who are not dogmatic.
Lastly, there was no significant correlation between dogmatism scores
and uncertainty scores.
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APPENDIX A
Reconstructed Form
Instructions:

of~okeach

Dogmatism Scale (Form P)

Circle the number after each statement that represents

your agreement or disagreement with that statement.
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

=
=
=
=

=
=
=

Strong Agreement
Moderate Agreement
Slight Agreement
Uncertainty due to ambiguous nature of the statement
Slight Disagreement
Moderate Disagreement
Strong Disagreement

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in ·common.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

2.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form
of democracy is a government run by those who are the most intelligent.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

3.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal,
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain
political groups.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

4.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the
people who believe in the same thing he does.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

5.

In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard
against id€as put out by people or groups in one•s own camp than by
those in opposite camps.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

6. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its
members cannot exist for long.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
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7.

It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

8.

In this complicat~d world of ours the only way we can know what's
goi.ng on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

9.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what•s going on
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

10. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and assoc-

iates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one•s own.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

11. The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
future that counts.

It is only the

3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
12. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble 11 all or nothing at all 11 •
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
13. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed import-

ant social and moral problems don•t really understand what•s going
on.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

14. Most people just don•t know what•s good for them.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
15. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful
of really great thinkers.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
16. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the
things they stand for.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
17. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
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18. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that
life becomes meaningful.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 ;.3

19. Of all the differ~nt philosophies which exist in this world there is
probably only one which is correct.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

20. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to
be pretty 11 Wishy-washy" as a person.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

21. To compromise without political opponents is dangerous because it
usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

22. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from
the way we do.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

23. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers
primarily his own happiness.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

24. There are two kinds of people in the world:
truth and those who are against the truth.

those who are for the

3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

25. My blood whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he•s wrong.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
26. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

27. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren•t worth the paper
they are printed on.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

28. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3
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29. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

30. Most people just don•t give a 11 damn 11 for others.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

31. I 1 d like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve
my prob 1ems.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

32. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

33. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

34. Once I get worked up in a heated conversation I just can't stop.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

35. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I am being understood.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

36. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am
going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

37. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

38. While I don•t like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition
i~ to become a great man, like Einstein or Beethoven or Shakespeare.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

39. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

40. If given the chance I waul d do somethi.ng of. great benefit to the
world.
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3

APPENDIX B
SCORES USED IN COMPUTING KENDALL 1 S RANK-ORDER CORRELATION

Subject
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

~

Dogmatism Score · Uncertainty ·score · · ·n·Higher · ·# ·Lower
63
74
81
89
95
103
109
112
112
113
114
114
116
116
121
121
121
121
122
122
123
123
124
124
125
125
129
130
133
134
134
134
135
135
135
136
137
138
138

10
34
6
0
0
0
2
1
2
0
3
1
0
3
1
11
4
2
3
4
2
2
0
5
1
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
0
4
18
2
2

4
0
10
81
81
81
34
57
34
78
26
55
76
26
54
1
17
30
24
17
20
28
67
12
46
65
65
65
27
64
45
63
45
26
45
16
0
25
25

114
119
105
0
0
0
57
34
56
0
30
33
0
28
32
103
80
52
26
78
52
52
0
81
31
0
0
0
47
0
27
0
26
0
25
64
84
81
0
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Appendix B Continued:
..
·· subject ·

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Dogmatism ·score · ·Uncerta; nt.Y ·Score · · ·#Higher · ·#Lower · ·

139
139_
139
140
141
142
142
142
143
143
143
144
144
145
145
146
147
147
147
147
149
151
151
152
152
153
153
153
154
154
155
155
155
156
156
157
158
158
159
159
160
163
163
163
163
164
164
164

0
1
0
2
0
0
1
5
2
4
1
7
1
4.
1
0
2
0
0
8
10
0
11
1
0
2
0
5
0
2
1
1
1
9
0

2
5
4
0
3
2
1
2
3
9
2
0
0

57
41
56
25
55
55
40
11
24
14
37
7
36
13
35
46
21
45
45
6
1
43 .
0
31
41
18
40
7
39
17
28
28
28
1

34
16
6
7
31
9
13
22
13
9
1

11
24
24

24
0

38
38
0

0
21
60
35
54
21
63
21
52
21
0
31
0
0
56
59
0
59
17
0
26
0
45
0
24
14
14
14
45
0
20
38
35
0
29
19
12
18
26
35
18
0
0

40

Appendix B continued:
·subject
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

· ·oogmatism ·score ·· ·uncertainty ·score ·· ·#Higher ·· ·#tower ··
166-166
167
169
169
170
170
171
174
174
180
180
181
181
183
183
184
184
186
187
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3
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1
0
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